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Abstract
A wealth of evidence has demonstrated that individuals’ participation in collective 
actions largely derives from perceived group disadvantages. In the present research, 
we hypothesized that engagement in protest activities can be attenuated if the dis-
advantages originate from legitimate figures of authority. Across three experiments 
based on vignettes describing a hypothetical work setting (total N = 670), we found 
consistent support for this prediction. In Study 1, we showed that intention to partic-
ipate in a protest movement in reaction to an unfavourable distribution of outcomes 
was lower when legitimacy of the group’s authority was high (vs. low). In addition, 
a reduction in anger was found to play a mediating role. Studies 2 and 3 further dem-
onstrated that these effects only occurred when participants were confronted with 
a relatively low disadvantage (as opposed to a high disadvantage). In an attempt to 
identify underlying mechanisms, Study 3 emphasized the moral implications that lie 
behind responses to high (vs. low) disadvantageous decisions and that shape resist-
ance processes. Taken together, these findings call for more consideration for the 
role of group authorities in the comprehension of collective action tendencies and 
give insights to better understand how and when authority legitimacy can serve to 
perpetuate social disparities and hinders the fight against injustices.
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Introduction
In response to the introduction of restrictive socio-economic policies and unpop-
ular reforms, the number of massive protest movements around the world has 
risen dramatically in recent years (Ancelovici et al., 2016; Della Porta & Mattoni, 
2014). The cases of the Indignados movement in Spain, the Occupy Wall Street 
movement in the USA or, more recently, the Gilet Jaunes movement in France are 
examples amid others. Notwithstanding the claims and grievances raised by the 
protesters are manifold and often disparate, it seems that a shared sense of being 
disadvantaged by an unequal distribution of wealth among citizens has unani-
mously fuelled such a surge of political activism. As an illustration, the Declara-
tion of the Occupation of New York City was presented as follows: “As we gather 
together in solidarity to express a feeling of mass injustice, we must not lose sight 
of what brought us together” (Occupy Wall Street, 2011). In parallel, the mutual-
ization of opposition forces and close cooperation between social actors in estab-
lishing collective protest movements (e.g. political marches, strikes, petitions) 
still remains a preferred modus operandi to redress for the disadvantages resulting 
from an unequal system and restore justice of the social order.
Likewise, research in social psychology has largely acknowledged that the per-
ception that one’s group suffers from structural injustice or disadvantages plays a 
crucial role in individuals’ support and participation in collective actions (Klan-
dermans, 1997; Wright, 2001; Wright et al., 1990). In the present work, we aimed 
to expand this research by investigating the effects of collective disadvantages on 
intention to engage in protest actions as a function of authority legitimacy.
Collective Disadvantages and Participation in Collective Actions
By the late 1960s, the relative deprivation theory (RTD) posited collective con-
sciousness of being unfairly deprived of benefits or provided with burdens as a 
prerequisite for individuals’ engagement in protest movements. Collective actions 
were theorized to build on the perception that one’s group suffer from more disad-
vantages relative to other similar groups (Runciman, 1966; Smith & Ortiz, 2002). 
Since then, a myriad of studies has provided convergent support for this view 
and the importance of perceived injustice in sparking collective actions has been 
reflected in a great number of social psychological models (Becker & Tausch, 
2015; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013; Van Zomeren et al., 2008, 2018; 
Wright, 2010). Perhaps most notably, this is the case with one of the most influ-
ential theoretical models to date, the social identity model of collective action 
(SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2004, 2008), which elevates perceived injustice as 
one of the few key precursors of collective actions. Along with group efficacy 
(i.e. the extent to which protest actions are viewed to be effective for redress of 
grievances) and identification (i.e. the extent to which protest group has a par-
ticular subjective importance), this model proposes that individuals take part in 
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collective actions to the extent that their group is perceived to deal with blatant 
inequalities. Similarly, in their review of the collective action literature, Becker 
and Tausch (2015) illuminated the pivotal role of injustice appraisals, in addition 
to efficacy appraisals, in fuelling motivation to engage in a protest movement. 
Accordingly, perceived group disadvantages lie at the very heart of the concerns 
leading individuals to participate in collective actions.
Research surrounding the RDT has highlighted that group-based injustice encom-
passes cognitive and affective components, which both play a role in mobilizing 
people into collective actions (see Walker & Smith, 2002). Perceived disadvantage 
constitutes the cognitive dimension of injustice, whereas group-based emotions, 
such as anger or resent, form the affective dimension. Against this backdrop, a wide 
range of studies have shown that perceived group disadvantages propel participa-
tion in collective actions through anger (e.g. Becker & Tausch, 2015; Leach et al., 
2007; Thomas et al., 2009; Van Zomeren et al, 2004, 2008; Yzerbyt et al., 2003). 
Based on the intergroup emotion theory (Mackie et  al., 2000), the perception of 
being treated unfairly has been theorized as eliciting emotional reactions of anger, 
which in turn trigger action tendencies to resist and oppose those responsible for the 
wrongs committed.
However, despite a high sense of disadvantage, individuals may not necessar-
ily invest much effort into initiating or taking part in collective actions. It has been 
shown that socio-economic inequalities and structural status-based differences 
between social groups may be well accepted by those most negatively affected and 
may provoke relatively little opposition (Becker et al., 2017; Jost et al., 2012, 2017). 
In the same vein, the present research focused on the role of group authorities and 
aimed to show that the perceived legitimacy of authority figures is capable of mit-
igating the readiness to participate in protest movements in response to an unfair 
treatment.1
Legitimacy of Authority Figures and Compliance
Legitimacy of authority may be defined as the perception that authority figures, such 
as CEOs, managers, or group leaders, are appropriately entitled to exercise their 
power and status within a given community (Tyler, 2006a). An authority derives 
its legitimacy, in part, from alignment with social norms, values, or practices that 
are commonly shared within the group (Zelditch, 2001), or from respect with the 
rules of procedural justice, such as neutrality or representativeness (e.g. Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler, 2006a, 2010).
1 Throughout this manuscript, we consider injustice (or, more broadly, disadvantage) in reference to the 
dimension of distributive justice, which corresponds to what one person or group receives from a given 
distribution in relation to others or in relation to other groups. This dimension has largely been privileged 
in conceptualizations and operationalizations of perceived injustice in socio-psychological research on 
collective actions, particularly those developed around the RTD (see Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 
2013). In parallel, procedural justice refers to the justice of formal policies surrounding outcome distri-
bution and how authorities make decisions and treat group members (Blader & Tyler, 2003).
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Perception of legitimacy is vital for the group functioning and has profound 
consequences for cooperation between group members and authority (Tyler, 1997, 
2006a). As a fundamental collective belief (Johnson et al., 2006), legitimacy estab-
lishes an implicit social contract giving authority the right to impose decisions and 
obliging subordinates to comply with them, regardless of punishments or rewards 
that they may receive (Zelditch & Walker, 2003). In this sense, legitimacy creates a 
sense of obligation and deference to authority and justifies group members’ consent 
to its decisions (Tyler, 2006b).
A wide array of work has shown that individuals tend to be more compliant with 
decisions made by authorities that are perceived legitimate (e.g. Hegtvedt & John-
son, 2009; Levi et al., 2009; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler, 2006a). For example, coop-
eration with legal authorities, acceptance of judicial sentences, obedience to the 
law, and compliance with tax payments have been found to be stronger to the extent 
that they are viewed as legitimate (e.g. Jackson et al., 2012; Murphy et al., 2009; 
Tyler, 2006b). Similar perspectives can also be drawn from research on obedience 
to authority showing that individuals are more willing to obey authorities to whom 
they attribute strong legitimacy, such as the scientists (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; 
Milgram, 1974).
The power of legitimacy is not only limited to situations where authority’s 
actions are inconsequential to group members. A number of studies in sociology 
have shown that authorities with strong legitimacy can promote acceptance of dis-
advantageous treatments (e.g. Cohen, 1986; Hegtvedt & Johnson, 2000; Johnson 
& Ford, 1996; Walker et al., 1986; Zelditch & Walker, 1984). Legitimacy bolsters 
and nurtures legitimation of authority figures’ actions and decisions, as well as pos-
sible adverse repercussions for the group. The more disadvantages are initiated by 
authorities who enjoy strong legitimacy, the more individuals feel that these disad-
vantages are tolerable and acceptable. Following Zelditch and Walker’s theorization 
(1984), authority legitimacy fosters acceptance of unfair distribution by creating 
expectations that peers are supportive for such a distribution (i.e. endorsement) and 
that higher authorities have given their assent (i.e. authorization). Thus, legitimacy 
offers a powerful source of coercion as presupposing that others of the same rank 
and above consent to the authority’s decisions, no matter how unfair they may be, 
and would adopt formal and informal sanctions in case of disobedience. Moreover, 
legitimacy provides a solid basis for external validation by dispelling uncertainties 
that could arise from a disadvantageous situation. Indeed, by acting in contradic-
tion with certain principles of justice (e.g. by distributing more to someone with-
out apparent motive), authorities are likely to arouse suspicions about potential 
irregularities in the normal course of events, which may stimulate action. Because it 
implies the endorsement of peers and authorization of higher authorities, legitimacy 
reduces uncertainty by giving credit and confidence in the decisions made, which 
in turn curtails resistance actions. In this sense, information about the legitimacy of 
authorities can be used as heuristics or situational cues to reduce uncertainty about 
what to think and how to act in an explicitly disadvantageous situation (for a close 
view, see Van den Bos et al., 2001).
Moreover, legitimacy has been found to mitigate negative emotional reactions 
to experiencing unfair situations, such as anger, but also frustration or resentment, 
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which in turn reduce the propensity to cooperate with the authority (Johnson 
et  al., 2000, 2016; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Legitimacy acts as a brake on affective-
based motivational forces stimulated by injustice and attenuates their corresponding 
behavioural tendencies (i.e. resistance and opposition). According to Johnson et al. 
(2016), because they create uncertainty about one’s own feelings and reinforce the 
fear of sanctions and ostracism, legitimacy processes act as control mechanisms by 
regulating the intensity of emotional responses to an unfair distribution of outcomes.
Although the effects of legitimacy have been widely documented in past research, 
only limited attention has been given as to whether legitimate figures of authority 
can equally alter individuals’ participation in collective actions. Yet, while legiti-
macy may decrease feelings of anger and increase acceptance of detrimental deci-
sions, it is reasonable to assume that intention to participate in collective actions 
could be reduced as well. In the face of unfavourable decisions resulting from a 
legitimate authority, it is plausible that people will be less prompt to actively take 
action. Accordingly, the purpose of this study was to expand the research on legiti-
macy of authority by examining whether legitimate authorities can reduce engage-
ment in protest actions in response to collective disadvantages, notably through a 
reduction in anger.
Legitimacy of Authority Figures and Violation of Moral Values
In this research, we argued that legitimacy has the potential to restrict individuals’ 
readiness to protest, but only when perceived disadvantages are relatively low. In 
contrast, we hypothesized that the legitimacy effects would be undermined when the 
sense of collective disadvantage reaches high levels. First, this is because a strong 
disadvantage would generate intense feelings of group-based anger that legitimacy 
could not mitigate. Second, when a decision is extremely disadvantageous, strong 
moral concerns would arise and freeze the capacity of legitimacy to mitigate anger 
and, in turn, engagement in collective actions.
Research has indeed shown that violation of moral beliefs can provoke very 
intense reactions, such as violent and deviant behaviours (Mullen & Nadler, 2008). 
In addition, when rules or decisions are at odds with moral values, procedural justice 
and legitimacy have been shown to be discounted as relevant factors in judgment and 
cannot have a mitigating effect on compliance with authorities (Skitka, 2002; Skitka 
et al., 2009; Skitka & Mullen, 2002; for a discussion, see Skitka & Morgan, 2014). 
Legitimacy can protect against deleterious effects caused by an adverse decision to 
the extent moral standards are not significantly challenged. When moral convictions 
are at stake (as is the case, for example, in a situation of great injustice), individu-
als’ principles of judgment are based on the sole moral value that they confer on the 
decision taken (i.e. Is it morally “right” or “wrong”?) and refrain from deferring to 
authorities, regardless of how legitimate they are. For example, Skitka et al. (2009) 
investigated people’s reactions to court decisions involving intense moral values 
(e.g. legalization of physician-assisted suicide). They observed that moral beliefs 
are the main predictors of people’s acceptance of decisions made by judges and not 
their legitimacy. Regardless of judicial authorities’ perceived legitimacy, those who 
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were morally opposed estimated the final decision to be less fair and expressed more 
rejection. To echo the argument developed above, an unfair situation might reveal to 
be at odds with individuals’ moral stances and, as such, could dispel uncertainty on 
which the potential of legitimacy for action is drawn. Moral resonance relating to 
disadvantages signals that the situation is unambiguously irregular, thereby provid-
ing justification for actively engaging in resistance movements.
Studies have also shown that emotions arising from the violation of moral values 
would be too intense to be mitigated by authority legitimacy or fair procedures (e.g. 
Mullen & Nadler, 2008; Mullen & Skitka, 2006). Breaches with important moral 
values have been shown to trigger strong emotional reactions, such as moral out-
rage or anger (Molho et al., 2017; Tetlock et al., 2000; Van Zomeren & Lodewijkx, 
2005), which are automatic responses, often difficult to control (Haidt et al., 1993). 
This, in turn, guides justice judgments and strongly motivates to act in ways that 
maintain and preserve one’s sense of morality (Skitka, 2002; Skitka et  al., 2008). 
In other words, given that moral values are higher-order principles and meaning-
ful stances, any transgression poses an acute threat, alerting individuals, through 
heightened emotions, that strong disadvantages are occurring and that appropriate 
responses are needed to remedy them (see Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). In this case, 
the legitimacy of authority becomes of little use in reducing such emotional reac-
tions and, consequently, protest reactions.
As a result, we contended that the level of perceived disadvantages could condi-
tion the effects of authority legitimacy on participation in collective actions. In par-
ticular, we expected that a legitimate authority would reduce willingness to engage 
in protest actions as a response to unfair decisions only when these decisions are 
weakly unfair, but not when they are strongly unfair. When individuals are sub-
jected to very unfair decisions that would profoundly challenge their moral values, 
intense emotional reactions will overshadow the effect of legitimacy. Therefore, in 
the present research, we hypothesized an interaction between perceived disadvan-
tage and legitimacy, so that legitimacy would only affect collective action intentions 
when disadvantage is relatively low. Under these conditions, because the authority’s 
decisions are less likely to conflict with moral values, we predicted that violation 
of moral values should be lower, which would temper anger and, in turn, would 
reduce collective action tendencies.2 Conversely, a condition of strong disadvantage 
would fail to trigger such mitigation. In other words, perceived disadvantages would 
moderate the effects of authority legitimacy on intention to participate in collective 
actions, through the serial mediation of moral value violation and anger.
It is important to underscore that the present research’s expectations are in line 
with a great deal of research that has recently been placed on moral issues in the 
study of collective actions (see Van Zomeren et al., 2018). This research indicates 
2 We are not suggesting that a condition of low injustice would not have moral implications, but rather 
that, at this level, moral convictions are sufficiently preserved for an authority to be able to assert its 
legitimacy as a source of coercion over group members. Consequently, the legitimacy, because it creates 
an obligation of deference to authority, replaces the application of moral standards, provided that indi-
viduals’ moral system itself be not profoundly defied by the authority’s actions or rules.
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notably that engagement in collective actions can be boosted when individuals mor-
alize perceived disadvantages, that is, when perceived disadvantages derive from a 
violation of individuals’ moral values or convictions (Kutlaca et al., 2019; Mazzoni 
et al., 2015; Van Zomeren & Lodewijkx, 2005; Van Zomeren et al., 2011, 2012). For 
example, Mazzoni et al. (2015) conducted two survey studies with Italian activists 
and Italian citizens from general public in the context of the Italian Water Move-
ment (i.e. which was a social movement protesting against the liberalization of water 
resources in Italy). They examined whether and how support for the movement may 
be linked to participants’ moral values (i.e. notably, in this context, the fundamental 
right to water). They consistently found that activism was fuelled by the perception 
that one’s moral values in terms of free access to water have been harmed. In addi-
tion, this relationship was mediated by identification to the movement. According 
to the authors’ reasoning, support for collective actions is shaped by the extent to 
which perceived moral violation caused by disadvantage fits with a protest group 
identity. People are more likely to engage in a movement or politicized group whose 
identity and central social norms resonate with their own moral values and are 
directed at redressing moral violation (Van Zomeren et al., 2012). Our research will 
add to this research in studying the still under-examined relationship between per-
ceived disadvantages and moral values on collective actions, while considering the 
moderating role of authority legitimacy, which in itself has been found to be highly 
associated with morality.
Beyond this, the present work sought to provide innovative and solid contribu-
tions to research. First, we intended to show that authority legitimacy plays a sig-
nificant role in engagement in collective actions and that it should be distinguished 
from perceived injustice. Although both are closely related (see Hegtvedt et  al., 
2016), justice and legitimacy are conceptually distinct constructs. Justice, and 
notably distributive justice, refers to the perception that an allocation of resources 
from an authority does not benefit more other groups than one’s group. Legitimacy 
corresponds to the perception that one person is entitled to exercise a position of 
power and authority over subordinates. In this sense, justice pertains to the actions 
enacted by an authority towards individuals, while legitimacy, more broadly, per-
tains to the person itself and appropriateness of his or her social position within a 
group. Accordingly, authority legitimacy differs conceptually from perceived injus-
tice and cannot be considered as a mere dimension feeding justice perceptions.3 
Besides, individuals can establish perceptions of justice quite independently of how 
they construct perceptions of legitimacy (Caldeira & Gibson, 1992; Gibson, 1989). 
Research has shown that group authorities may be perceived high in legitimacy even 
if they allocate outcomes unfairly, notably because group members tend to attrib-
ute authority’s unfair actions to external causes and to disclaim any responsibility 
for its wrongs (Hegtvedt et al., 2003; Hegdvedt & Johnson, 2000). Therefore, it is 
3 In this regard, it is important to note that research has rather shown that justice (and notably procedural 
justice) might be best conceptualized as a component of legitimacy than the converse (see Colquitt et al., 
2001, 2005; Hegtvedt & Johnson, 2000; Tyler, 2006a).
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fundamental to differentiate legitimacy from perceived injustice in our understand-
ing of engagement in collective actions.
Second, as a corollary, another important contribution of our research is to exam-
ine for the first time how authority legitimacy may mitigate the impact of perceived 
disadvantage on collective actions. Despite that research has repeatedly shown 
that both strongly interact in their effects on cooperation with authority figures 
(e.g. Hegtvedt et al., 2016; Walker, 2014; Walker et al., 1986; Zelditch & Walker, 
1984), the interaction between disadvantage and legitimacy on collective actions has 
never been addressed. Therefore, it is of great interest to analyse legitimacy inde-
pendently from injustice and to examine how legitimacy and injustice perceptions 
both together affect collective actions and how they can allow to reconsider the well-
established effect of perceived group disadvantage.
The Present Research
The current research sought to examine the role of authority legitimacy in the effects 
of collective disadvantages on intention to participate in protest actions. We con-
ducted three studies using fictitious vignettes to manipulate authority legitimacy. In 
Study 1, we manipulated authority legitimacy with three levels (i.e. high, moderate, 
and low),4 while perceived disadvantage was held constant at a medium level. More 
specifically, we tested the following hypothesis:
H1 We expected that the more an authority is perceived as legitimate, the less peo-
ple would intend to engage in protest actions in response to collective disadvantages.
In Studies 2 and 3, we manipulated both legitimacy and disadvantage (i.e. low vs. 
high + one condition with no-explicit disadvantage in Study 3) and examined the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
H2 We expected authority legitimacy to reduce collective action intentions only 
when disadvantage is low.
In all studies, we further examined the mechanism underlying the effects pre-
dicted in H1 and H2. In Studies 1 and 2, we looked at the mediating role of anger, 
while study 3 tested a moderated serial mediation model including violation of 
moral values and anger. The following hypotheses were tested:
H3 We expected anger to mediate the effect of authority legitimacy on collective 
action intentions.
4 We included a medium condition with the aim of examining the linearity of the relationship between 
legitimacy and collective action intentions, but also with the aim of offering a more nuanced and elabo-
rated test of our hypotheses, which is often examined through only two conditions (i.e., high vs. low).
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H4 We expected anger to mediate the effect of authority legitimacy on collective 
action intentions only when disadvantage is low.
H5 We expected the effect of authority legitimacy on collective action intentions to 





We determined the required sample size for this study by performing an a priori 
power analysis with G*Power v.3.1 (Faul et  al., 2007), testing for a main effect 
with three independent groups. Based on a medium estimated effect size of f = 0.25 
and a desired statistical power of 0.80 (0.05 alpha level), it was established that 
we needed a minimum of 128 participants for the predicted main effect. Thus, 140 
French undergraduate students were recruited and voluntarily took part in this study 
(MAge = 20.21, SDAge = 2.16; women: N = 81). They were randomly assigned to one 
of three experimental conditions (legitimacy: low vs. moderate vs. high). After con-
senting to the study, participants were instructed to read a fictitious vignette and 
imagine themselves as if they were working in a small company. They were told that 
a new manager was recently hired in this company by an independent recruitment 
firm. Upon his arrival, he announced that he intended to reorganize the way things 
work at the company in order to improve its productivity, which would require from 
employees to work extra hours for the same wage (i.e. which corresponds to the 
group disadvantage). The vignette then indicated that, after the meeting, some peo-
ple showed their discontent and planned on taking action to oppose such a decision. 
Right after this, participants wrote down their thoughts about the vignette. They then 
completed measures of anger and collective action intention. Finally, they reported 
sociodemographics (i.e. sex and age) before being debriefed and thanked for their 
participation.
Independent Variable
Authority legitimacy was manipulated in the vignette by varying information about 
how the company’s new boss was appointed. In the condition of high legitimacy, 
participants were informed that he was hired very impartially by the recruitment 
firm and that he met all the required qualifications to be the leader of the company. 
In the condition of moderate legitimacy, we also informed participants that the new 
boss’ educational background was very well suited to the position. However, we 
added that he might have benefited from the help of someone he knew from the 
recruitment firm who got him the job by “pulling some strings”. In the condition of 
low legitimacy, we outlined that the new boss was not appropriately qualified for the 
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position and that he might have received support from someone in the recruitment 
firm.
Legitimacy was manipulated in a way to make it distinct from the disadvantage. 
Indeed, both concepts being relatively close, it may be easy to manipulate one while 
affecting the other. This is why we manipulated legitimacy by varying how someone 
is designated as the group authority (for a close procedure, see Hays & Goldstein, 
2015). In contrast, disadvantage here refers to the authority’s actions towards group 
members (through the distribution of outcomes such as work time and salaries). By 
employing such a “distal” manipulation of legitimacy that disentangles the designa-
tion of the authority from its actions, we ensured that legitimacy does not intertwine 
with the effects of disadvantage and matches well with its definition.
A pilot study was carried out to verify whether this manipulation can elicit 
expected levels of legitimacy. Thirty-eight undergraduate students had to read one of 
three scenarios and then to report, on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 (= not at 
all) to 7 (= yes absolutely), whether they believe that it is “legitimate” and “fair” that 
the new boss holds his or her position (r = 0.79, p < 0.001). Results gave evidence for 
a linear relationship between the experimental conditions and perceived legitimacy, 
β = 0.82, SE = 0.21, t = 9.004, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [1.483, 2.346]. The new boss was 
rated to be more legitimate in the condition of high legitimacy (M = 5.96, SD = 1.12) 
than in the condition of moderate legitimacy (M = 4.80, SD = 1.16), and even more 
than in the condition of low legitimacy (M = 2.13, SD = 1.09).
Measures
First, we measured anger with two items (i.e. participants had to report whether, in 
the situation detailed in the vignette, they would have felt “angry” and “furious” 
after the new boss has announced his decision; r = 0.80, p < 0.001). Second, inten-
tion to participate in collective actions was assessed with two items asking partici-
pants “whether they approve the protesters’ actions” and “whether they would like 
to participate in the protesters’ actions”.5 For ecological validity reasons, we gave 
examples of actions, such as “signing petitions” or “going on strike”. Both items 
were averaged (r = 0.68, p < 0.001). Both measures were accompanied with response 
scales ranging from 1 (= not at all) to 7 (= yes absolutely).
5 Drawing upon earlier works showing that collective actions can take several forms, ranging from mod-
erate (or normative collective actions, i.e. actions that are in line with the acceptable norms in the domi-
nant social system) to radical forms of (or non-normative collective actions; i.e., actions that break with 
such norms) collective actions (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011), we also asked participants, 
for exploratory purposes, for their intention to participate in non-normative forms of collective actions 
(i.e., same questions were asked, but different examples were given, like “illegal occupation of work-
places”, “destruction of work-related equipment and materials”, or “use of violence”). But for the sake 
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Results
To test H1 and H3, we created two orthogonal contrasts, namely C1, as the planned 
contrast (conditions were coded as follows: low legitimacy = −1, moderate legiti-
macy = 0, high legitimacy =  + 1),6 and C2, as the residual. (Conditions were coded 
as follows: low legitimacy =  + 1, moderate legitimacy = −2, high legitimacy =  + 1.) 
To conclude for the linear effect of legitimacy, C1 must be significant, while C2 
should not (see Abelson & Prentice, 1997).
Manipulation Check
To check for our manipulation, we asked participants to complete the same meas-
ure as the one used in the pilot study (r = 0.80, p < 0.001). Results showed that C1 




 = 0.60, while C2 was not, β = 0.10, p = 0.066. Thus, as we expected, the new 
boss was judged to be more legitimate in the condition of high legitimacy (M = 6.01, 
SD = 1.09) than in the condition of moderate legitimacy (M = 4.55, SD = 1.37), and 
more legitimate in the condition of moderate legitimacy than in the condition of low 
legitimacy (M = 2.26, SD = 1.19).
Anger
Analyses showed that C1 was significant, β = −0.40, SE = 0.17, t = −5.03, p < 0.001, 
95% CI = [−1.190, −0.518], 2
p
 = 0.16, while C2 was not, β = −0.10, p = 0.231. This 































Fig. 1  Collective action intentions as a function of authority legitimacy Note Error bars represent stand-
ard errors
6 Given that we expected that the more legitimacy is high, the less people would be willing to participate 
in collective actions, we tested here a linear relationship between the three conditions of legitimacy, so 
that differences are anticipated between all the conditions, with the medium condition in between.
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SD = 1.48) than in the moderate legitimacy condition (M = 4.05, SD = 1.73) and than 
in the low legitimacy condition (M = 4.56, SD = 1.58).
Collective Action Intentions
We found a significant effect of C1, β = −0.27, SE = 0.18, t = −3.31, p = 0.001, 95% 
CI = [−0.926, −0.233], 2
p
 = 0.07, but not of C2, β = 0.10, p = 0.222. Intention to 
take part in collective actions was the lowest when legitimacy was high (M = 4.23, 
SD = 1.83) and the highest when legitimacy was low (M = 5.39, SD = 1.58). The 
moderate condition fell in between (M = 4.45, SD = 1.60; see Fig. 1).
Mediation Analyses
To test whether anger mediated the effect of legitimacy on intention to engage in col-
lective actions, we run a mediation analysis by using the PROCESS macro (Model 
4; Hayes, 2013) with 5000 bootstrap re-samples. We entered C1 as the predictor, 
anger as the mediator, intention to engage in collective actions as the predicted vari-
ables, and C2 as a covariate. In line with H3, we found a significant indirect effect, 
B = −0.38, SE = 0.10, 95% CI = [−0.582, −0.210] (see Fig. 2).
Discussion
Consistent with H1 and H3, the present results showed that, in the face of disadvan-
tageous decisions, increased authority legitimacy reduced willingness to participate 
in collective actions. Moreover, anger mediated this effect.
Study 2
While Study 1 held the level of disadvantage constant, the purpose of Study 2 was to 
manipulate it and compare the effect of legitimacy on intention to participate in col-
lective actions when disadvantage is low or high. In line with H2, we predicted that 
Legitimacy 
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an authority with high legitimacy can attenuate collective action motivation only when 
disadvantage is low. In contrast, when disadvantage is high, legitimacy could no longer 
have an impact on individuals’ motivation to take action. In addition, we were also 
interested in examining whether the intensity of disadvantage could affect the media-
tion by anger (see H4). To the extent that high disadvantage instigates high levels of 
anger, regardless of legitimacy, anger could not be reduced and therefore should not 
play a mediating role between legitimacy and collective action intention. Procedure and 




Reporting the same effect size as in Study 1 (f = 0.25) and a desired statistical power of 
0.80, we again performed an a priori power analysis with G*Power, testing, this time, 
an interaction effect, with six groups in total. This indicated that we needed a minimum 
of 155 participants. We recruited a total of 228 French undergraduate students who vol-
untarily participated in this study (MAge = 19.42, SDAge = 1.72; women: N = 186). They 
were randomly allocated to one of six experimental conditions of a 3 (legitimacy: high 
vs. moderate vs. low) × 2 (disadvantage: low vs. high) between-subject factorial design. 
Similar to Study 1, participants were instructed to read the same vignette (including 
the additional manipulation of disadvantage) before completing the measures of anger 
and collective action intention. Finally, they were asked for their sex and age and were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Independent Variables
We used the same manipulation of legitimacy as in Study 1. To manipulate the level 
of disadvantage, we provided participants with some information about the author-
ity’s decisions on changing the way things work in the workplace. In the condition of 
low disadvantage, participants read that the changes included longer working time but, 
as a compensation, a significant increase in the employees’ salary. In contrast, in the 
condition of high disadvantage, participants were told that in addition to longer work-
ing time, there will be significant cuts in their salary. It is important to note that the 
low disadvantage condition, which might appear as being quite advantageous because 
a financial compensation is offered, still remains disadvantageous because people are 
requested to work more than they used to do before. One may easily assume that the 
increase in salary could not fully compensate for the inconveniences caused by such an 
increase in working time. Besides, not all individuals want to earn more money in their 
work, some just do not want to work more.
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Measures
We measured anger and intention to participate in collective actions with the same 
items as in Study 1. Reliability of these measures proved to be satisfactory (anger: 
r = 0.83, p < 0.001; intention: r = 0.72, p < 0.001).
Results
Hypotheses were tested by computing the same contrasts as in Study 1. We per-
formed multiple regression analyses with C1, C2, disadvantage (coded as fol-
lows:—1 = low, 1 = high), and the two interaction products between disadvantage 
and each contrast. We concluded on significance of the interaction between the two 
independent variables with the conditions of legitimacy varying with each other 
when the product including C1 was significant, while the product including C2 was 
not.
Manipulation Checks
Using the same items as in Study 1 to check for the manipulation of legitimacy 
(r = 0.83, p < 0.001), analyses showed a significant effect of C1, β = 0.79, SE = 0.10, 
t = 19.47, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [1.735, 2.126], 2
p
 = 0.62, and a significant (though 
weaker) effect of C2, β = 0.09, SE = 0.06, t = 2.18, p = 0.030, 95% CI = [0.012, 
0.236], 2
p
 = 0.02. The new boss was evaluated as more legitimate in the condition 
of high legitimacy (M = 6.04, SD = 1.07) than in the condition of moderate legiti-
macy (M = 4.48, SD = 1.37), and more legitimate in the condition of moderate 
legitimacy than in the condition of low legitimacy (M = 2.18, SD = 2.00). The dis-
advantage variable was checked through one single item, which asked participants 
to report, on a 7-point rating scale, whether “they think that the new organization 
of work was fair”. Supporting the efficacy of our manipulation, participants evalu-
ated the new organization of work to be less fair in the condition of high disad-
vantage (M = 3.18, SD = 1.88) than in the condition of low disadvantage (M = 4.84, 
SD = 1.83), t(229) = 6.82, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [1.182, 2.143].
Anger
Analyses revealed a main effect of C1, β = −0.20, SE = 0.12, t = −3.63, p < 0.001, 
95% CI = [−0.696, −0.207], 2
p
 = 0.06, but not of C2, β = 0.08, p = 0.135. We also 
found a main effect of disadvantage, β = 0.49, SE = 0.10, t = 8.84, p < 0.001, 95% 
CI = [0.694, 1.092], 2
p
 = 0.26. More importantly, we found the expected interac-
tion between C1 and disadvantage, β = −0.15, SE = 0.12, t = −2.60, p = 0.010, 95% 
CI = [−0.567, −0.078], 2
p
 = 0.03, while the interaction with C2 was not significant, 
β = 0.02, p = 0.773. Decomposition of this interaction showed that C1 was non-sig-
nificant in the condition of high disadvantage, β = −0.06, p = 0.456, but was signifi-
cant in the condition of low disadvantage β = −0.35, SE = 0.18, t = −4.34, p < 0.001, 
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95% CI = [−1.125, −0.422], 2
p
 = 0.08, thus indicating that anger was lower when 
legitimacy was high (M = 2.20, SD = 1.15) than moderate (M = 2.59, SD = 1.52) and 
than low (M = 3.75, SD = 1.35). C2 was not significant in both conditions of disad-
vantage (ps > 0.20).
Collective Action Intentions
We found a significant main effect of C1, β = −0.21, SE = 0.12, t = −3.39, p = 0.001, 
95% CI = [−0.665, −0.177], 2
p
 = 0.05, while C2 was non-significant, β = 0.05, 
p = 0.459. Moreover, we found a main effect of disadvantage, β = 0.36, SE = 0.10, 
t = 5.96, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.402, 0.800], 2
p
 = 0.14. Consistent with H2, results 
also showed that the interaction between C1 and disadvantage was significant, 
β = −0.13, SE = 0.12, t = −2.22, p = 0.028, 95% CI = [−0.519, −0.031], 2
p
 = 0.02, 
while the interaction with C2 was not, β = 0.02, p = 0.741. Decompositions indi-
cated that C1 was not significant in the condition of high disadvantage, β = −0.07, 
p = 0.398, but was significant when disadvantage was low, β = −0.34, SE = 0.18, 
t = −3.90, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−1.047, −0.345], 2
p
 = 0.06. In this condition, col-
lective action intentions decreased as authority legitimacy increased, with the high 
legitimacy condition (M = 3.61, SD = 1.61) being lower than the low legitimacy 
condition (M = 5.00, SD = 1.49), and the moderate legitimacy condition in between 
(M = 4.22, SD = 1.59; see Fig. 3). Note that C2 was not significant in both conditions 
of disadvantage (ps > 0.40).
Moderated Mediation Analyses
Finally, we examined whether group disadvantage moderated the mediation of 
anger in the relationship between legitimacy and collective action intention. To do 
so, we performed moderated mediation analyses by using the PROCESS Model 8 
with 5000 bootstrap re-samples. C1 was entered into the analyses as the predictor, 
anger as the mediator, collective action intentions as the predicted variables, disad-
































Fig. 3  Collective action intentions as a function of legitimacy and disadvantage Note Error bars represent 
standard errors
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This analysis showed that the index of moderated mediation was significant, 
B = −0.34, SE = 0.13, 95% CI = [−0.603, −0.085]. More specifically, we observed 
that anger mediated the relationship between legitimacy and collective action inten-
tions in the condition of low disadvantage, B = −0.40, SE = 0.09, 95% CI = [−0.591, 
−0.230], but not in the condition of high disadvantage, B = −0.07, SE = 0.10, 95% 
CI = [−0.276, 0.125]. This analysis is plotted in Fig. 4.
Discussion
Consistent with H2 and H4, the present study evidenced that legitimacy reduced 
collective action intentions in response to low disadvantages. However, when partic-
ipants faced high disadvantages, our findings revealed that legitimacy was not influ-
ential on neither anger nor willingness to participate in collective actions. Relatedly, 
moderated mediation analyses provided evidence that the mediation of anger only 
occurred when disadvantage was low.
Study 3
Study 3 was an attempt to replicate and extent the Study 2’s findings by further 
examining the mechanisms underlying the interplay of legitimacy and disadvan-
tage on collective action intentions. While previous studies addressed anger as a 
mediator, the current study focused on both anger and violation of moral values. 
In line with H5, we predicted that legitimacy and disadvantage may interactively 
relate to collective action intentions not only through anger but also through vio-
lation of moral values. More specifically, we predicted that authority legitimacy 
should mitigate motivation to engage in collective actions by first reducing percep-
tion of violation of moral values and then anger, but only when disadvantage is low. 
However, when disadvantage is high, legitimacy should no longer predict collective 
action intentions, precisely because violation of moral values and anger cannot be 










(-1 = low, 0 = moderate, 
1 = high
Disadvantage
(-1 = low, 1 = high)
Fig. 4  Moderated mediation (Study 2) Note For visual clarity, we omitted paths including C2 and the 
interaction between C2 and disadvantage; tp < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Methodologically speaking, procedure and experimental materials were similar 
to Study 1 and 2, notwithstanding three main changes. First, whereas the previous 
study compared the effect of low disadvantage to a condition of high disadvantage, 
in this new study we additionally included a condition with supposedly no disadvan-
tages. In doing so, we aimed to examine whether the effect of legitimacy is exclusive 
of low levels of disadvantages or might arise even in the absence of explicit disad-
vantages. Drawing on earlier works showing that legitimacy may increase accept-
ance of authority’s decisions, even when those are not particularly disadvantageous 
(e.g. Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler, 2006a), we expected legitimacy to work alike in both 
the no-explicit and low disadvantage conditions. Second, whereas Study 2 manipu-
lated three levels of legitimacy (i.e. low, moderate, and high), in this study we only 
included two experimental conditions (i.e. low vs. high). Third, since our vignettes 
played out in a work setting, we sought to only recruit working participants, for 
whom this environment should be particularly relevant. As such, this could address 
a possible limitation in our previous studies that undergraduate students, who may 
be quite unfamiliar with work environments, could have inadequately imagined 
themselves in the vignette scenario and reacted without being really aware of the 
consequences and issues occurring at work, especially when it comes to decide on 
protesting (e.g. fear of dismissal).
Method
Participants and Procedure
Given that an identical experimental design as in the previous study was tested here 
again, sample size determination remained also the same. We approached a total 
sample of 302 participants by using the recruitment website Prolific with a monetary 
compensation of 1£ (MAge = 37.24, SDAge = 10.48; women: n = 177). Most of them 
were British (n = 287), and all the participants’ country of residence was the UK. All 
were working in a company when they completed the study: 32.8% reported being 
administrative personnel, 17.9% business managers, 15.6% technicians, and 10.6% 
higher executives or major professionals. On average, they had been working for 
6.70  years (SD = 6.01), and 80.3% had a full-time job. They were randomly allo-
cated to one of the six experimental conditions of a 2 (legitimacy: low vs. high) × 3 
(disadvantages: low vs. high vs. no-explicit disadvantage) between-subject factorial 
design. The procedure was similar to the previous studies.
Independent Variables
Manipulations of disadvantage and legitimacy only included some few changes 
compared with the previous studies. In order to simplify the experimental design, we 
decided to compare the conditions of high and low legitimacy only and remove the 
medium condition. Regarding the disadvantage variable, we additionally included 
a control condition with no-explicit disadvantage. Participants were told that the 
new boss intends to reorganize the company to improve productivity, without this 
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being supposed to have implications on the employees’ working time and salary. It 
is worthwhile noting that this control condition was labelled as a “no explicit disad-
vantage” condition. Although no disadvantage was overtly described in the scenario, 
it is clear that individuals can still infer the presence of disadvantages. First, the 
vignette specified that the new boss wants to initiate a change in the work organi-
zation. One can assume that this may in itself constitute a collective disadvantage 
(even though this is not personally involving), or that this may fuel the fear that 
disadvantages might occur sooner or later (such as dismissals). Second, even if the 
changes in work organization are supposed to have no implications for employees’ 
work time and salary, the mere fact that some were depicted to protest against it may 
potentially lead to believe that the changes might result in personally relevant disad-
vantages (other than salary and working time).
Measures 7
Unless otherwise specified, all responses to the following measures were given on 
7-point rating scales ranging from 1 (= not at all) to 7 (= yes absolutely).
Anger
We assessed anger with five items. Participants had to report whether they felt 
“angry”, “furious”, “irritated”, “outraged”, and “indignant” in reaction to the new 
boss’ decision (α = 0.96; M = 3.71, SD = 1.75).8
Violation of Moral Values
Perceived violation of moral values was measured with three items: “The decision 
made by the new company’s boss has clearly violated my moral values”, “I think 
that the decision made by the new company’s boss is immoral”, “The decision made 
by the new company’s boss conflicts with the moral beliefs that are important to 
me” (α = 0.92; M = 3.60, SD = 1.79).
7 For exploratory purposes, the present study also measured group efficacy, identification with the pro-
testers, and moral convictions. Since these variables are central to understanding engagement in collec-
tive actions (VanZomeren et al., 2008), they were additionally included in the study. However, as they 
deviated from our initial theoretical framework, we did not raise particular hypotheses about them. 
Therefore, for greater clarity, details about the measures and results were not reported in the manuscript 
but as supplementary materials.
8 Initially, we differentiated between a measure of anger (as assessed in Studies 1 and 2) and moral 
outrage (assessed with the three additional items; see Thomas & McGarty, 2009). However, after run-
ning factorial analyses, it turned out that only one factor with eigenvalues greater than 1 was extracted, 
accounting for 85.58% of the total variance, and with very high factor loadings going from .89 to .95. 
Consequently, we concluded that both constructs were not clearly distinguished in participants’ mind and 
decided to aggregate all five items within one single measure.
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Collective Action Intentions
Differently from previous studies, we assessed intention to participate in a collec-
tive action with five items asking participants whether they would be willing to help 
the protesters “organize and take part in a strike”, “create and distribute a petition”, 
“organize and participate in a demonstration”, “distribute flyers”, and “organize 
information sharing and discussion sessions” (see Teixeira et al., 2020, for a similar 
measure; α = 0.94; M = 3.08, SD = 1.70).
Results
We tested our hypotheses by computing two contrasts: C1, as the planned contrast 
(with conditions of disadvantage coded as follows: no-explicit disadvantage = −1, 
low = −1, high =  + 2), and C2, as the residual (with conditions coded as follows: 
low = −1, no-explicit disadvantage =  + 1, high = 0). We then performed multiple 
regression analyses with C1, C2, legitimacy (coded as follows:—1 = low, + 1 = high), 
and the two interaction products between legitimacy and each contrast.
Manipulation Checks
As a check for the legitimacy manipulation, we used the same items as in Stud-
ies 1 and 2 (r = 0.95, p < 0.001). As expected, participants rated the new boss to be 
more legitimate in the condition of high legitimacy (M = 5.55, SD = 1.68) than in 
the condition of low legitimacy (M = 2.10, SD = 1.15), t(300) = 20.71, p < 0.001, 
95% CI = [3.116, 3.770]. Regarding the manipulation of disadvantage, which was 
measured with the same single item as in Study 2, we found a significant effect of 
C1, β = 0.52, SE = 0.06, t = 10.63, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.524, 0.762], and a non-
significant effect of C2, β = −0.09, p = 0.074. The new boss’ decision was evaluated 
as less fair in the condition of high disadvantage (M = 2.36, SD = 1.25) than in the 
conditions of low (M = 4.10, SD = 1.53) and no-explicit disadvantage (M = 4.47, 
SD = 1.66).
Anger
On anger, we found a main effect of legitimacy, β = −0.28, SE = 0.08, t = −6.27, 
p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.643, −0.336], 2
p
 = 0.12. Moreover, we found a significant 
interaction between legitimacy and C1, β = −0.17, SE = 0.06, t = −3.86, p < 0.001, 
95% CI = [−0.104, −0.321], 2
p
 = 0.05, while the interaction with C2 was non-sig-
nificant, β = 0.03, p = 0.536. Decomposition analyses for this significant interac-
tion showed that legitimacy had a significant effect on anger in the conditions of 
low (LD) and no-explicit disadvantage (NED), β = −0.40, SE = 0.10, t = −7.24, 
p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.888, −0.508], 2
p
 = 0.15, such that participants reported 
being less angry when legitimacy was high (MLD = 2.65, SELD = 0.19; MNED = 2.05, 
274 Social Justice Research (2021) 34:255–284
1 3
SENED = 0.19, respectively) rather than low (MLD = 3.94, SELD = 0.19; MNED = 3.57, 
SENED = 0.19, respectively). However, the effect of legitimacy was not significant in 
the condition of high disadvantage, β = 0.04, p = 0.640.
Violation of Moral Values
Legitimacy was found to produce a main effect, β = −0.24, SE = 0.08, t = −5.06, 
p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.592, −0.260], 2
p
 = 0.08. The interaction between C1 
and legitimacy was also found to be significant, β = −0.20, SE = 0.06, t = −4.15, 
p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.364, −0.130], 2
p
 = 0.06, while the interaction with C2 was 
not, β = 0.08, p = 0.078. Decomposition of the significant interaction showed that 
legitimacy predicted violation in both the no-explicit and low disadvantage condi-
tions, β = −0.37, SE = 0.11, t = −6.31, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.872, −0.458], 2
p
 = 
0.12, so that participants perceived that their moral values are less violated when 
legitimacy was high (MLD = 2.86, SELD = 0.20; MNED = 1.79, SENED = 0.21, respec-
tively), rather than low (MLD = 3.84, SELD = 0.21; MNED = 3.50, SENED = 0.21, respec-
tively). However, the effect of legitimacy was not significant in the condition of high 
disadvantage, β = 0.04, p = 0.647.
Collective Action Intentions
Legitimacy had a significant main effect, β = −0.12, SE = 0.08, t = −2.45, p = 0.015, 
95% CI = [−0.366, −0.040], 2
p
 = 0.02. As predicted, we also found a signifi-
cant C1 * legitimacy interaction, β = −0.16, SE = 0.06, t = −3.32, p = 0.001, 95% 
CI = [−0.310, −0.079], 2
p
 = 0.04, while the C2 * legitimacy interaction was not 
significant, β = 0.07, p = 0.164 (see Fig.  5). Decomposing this significant interac-
tion showed that legitimacy predicted collective action intentions in the low and 
no-explicit disadvantage conditions, β = −0.23, SE = 0.10, t = −3.82, p < 0.001, 95% 
CI = [−0.593, −0.190], 2
p
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engage in collective actions (MLD = 2.47, SELD = 0.20; MNED = 1.72, SENED = 0.21, 
respectively) than did low legitimacy (MLD = 2.98, SELD = 0.20; MNED = 2.80, 
SENED = 0.20, respectively). However, the effect of legitimacy was not significant in 
the condition of high disadvantage, β = 0.11, p = 0.200.
Moderated Serial Mediation Analyses
As a test for the predicted moderated serial mediation, we used the model 85 of 
the PROCESS macro. Legitimacy was entered as the independent variable (X), C1 
as a moderator (W), and collective action intentions as the main outcome (Y). The 
mediators were successively perceived violation of moral values  (M1), and anger 
 (M2). C2 and the interaction product between C2 and legitimacy were included as 
covariates. The overall index of moderated mediation revealed to be significant, 
B = −0.07, SE = 0.03, 95% CI = [−0.151, −0.015]. Moreover, we found that the path 
going from legitimacy to collective action intentions through first violation of moral 
values and then anger is significant only in the combined conditions of no-explicit 
and low disadvantage, B = −0.06, SE = 0.03, 95% CI = [−0.123, −0.016], and not in 
the condition of high disadvantage, B = 0.007, SE = 0.02, 95% CI = [−0.022, 0.043] 
(see Fig. 6).
Discussion
Based on a sample of working participants, this study corroborated findings of 
Study 2. Consistent with H2, we found that high (vs. low) legitimacy reduced inten-
tion to take part in a collective action when group disadvantage was relatively low, 
but not when people faced high disadvantage. Also, the fact that both the condi-
tions of no-explicit and low disadvantage showed similar tendencies suggests that 
the effect of legitimacy can occur as long as disadvantages are not high. Moreover, 
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Fig. 6  Moderated serial mediation (Study 3) Note For visual clarity, we omitted paths including C2 and 
the interaction between C2 and legitimacy; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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legitimacy and disadvantage on collective action intentions. Consistent with H5, 
we found that low levels of disadvantage allow for legitimacy to reduce individu-
als’ desire to engage in a collective action, because it first reduced the overall per-
ception that moral values are transgressed, which subsequently attenuated anger. 
In contrast, high levels of disadvantage disrupted the effects of legitimacy, mostly 
because perception of moral violation and feeling of anger could not be reduced, 
which propelled a strong motivation for collective actions, regardless of the level of 
legitimacy.
General Discussion
Taken as a whole, the results observed in the present studies provided convergent 
support for our main hypothesis (H1) according to which intention to engage in 
collective actions to redress group disadvantage is likely to be reduced when in-
group authority is perceived to be legitimate. Consistent with H2, we also found 
that the level of disadvantage plays a crucial role, given that the effect of authority 
legitimacy appeared under low or moderate levels of disadvantage (or even when 
disadvantage was not made explicit) but not when the authority’s decisions were 
highly disadvantageous to group members. In an effort to understand the psychoso-
cial dynamics underlying these results, mediation and moderated mediation analy-
ses showed that legitimate authorities decreased the willingness to engage in protest 
actions because legitimacy contributes to tempering anger resulting from perceived 
injustice, but only in the condition of low disadvantage (and not when disadvantage 
was high). These findings were thus consistent with H3 and H4. Finally, in line with 
H5, Study 3 highlighted the key role played by morality: only in the case of a rela-
tively low perceived disadvantage (and not when disadvantage was high), authority 
legitimacy sequentially reduced the perception of moral value violation and, in turn, 
anger, which ultimately accounted for reduced intention to participate in collective 
actions.
Theoretical Implications
These results have important theoretical implications for research on legitimacy of 
authority figures or group leaders. We provided evidence that the attenuating effect 
of legitimacy not only applies to emotions and compliance with authority (e.g. 
Cohen, 1986; Hegtvedt & Johnson, 2000; Johnson et al., 2016), but also to protest 
behaviours. This finding suggests that legitimacy is a powerful factor that guarantees 
group members’ compliance and cooperation with authority, as well as less opposi-
tion. By fuelling the legitimization of disadvantages, authority legitimacy renders 
the justification of any form of protest invalid, thereby discouraging involvement in 
social movements. Therefore, legitimacy would be underpinned by a belief whereby 
people ought to comply with the authorities and to suppress any resistance forces. 
From this perspective, legitimacy gives a crucial political weapon to maintain the 
authority’s power and to limit the sources of rebellion that may arise in the face of 
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a decision with deleterious consequences for group members. It equips governance 
structures with an aura of protection securing the maintenance of their power and 
the exercise of their authority over group members while imposing changes that are 
detrimental to them. Besides, it is in the belief in the legitimacy of authorities that 
group members find the reasons for legitimizing unfair treatments and their tempera-
ment to oppose the hierarchy. However, such a “legitimate domination” is inherently 
unequal and contributes tremendously to perpetuating the disadvantages of those 
who are powerless by making them refrain from denouncing inequalities and fight-
ing for justice and better living standards (see Walker, 2014).
However, the power of legitimate authorities in reducing protest tendencies is not 
unlimited. As we have demonstrated in our studies, the level of authority legitimacy 
can alter collective action intentions only in conditions depicting relatively low col-
lective disadvantages. In Study 1, the disadvantages can be qualified as moderate 
(i.e. there was an increase in work time, but salary was left untouched), while they 
were either low or implicitly mentioned in Studies 2 and 3. As expected, the same 
pattern of results consistently came out in all these conditions. Taken as a whole, 
they have in common that the disadvantages can easily be accepted and justified by 
external reasons (i.e. beyond the authority’s responsibilities). They are ambiguous 
or uncertain enough, in terms of whether they are unfair or not, for people not to 
feel too much offended and for legitimacy to have a room to operate. In contrast, the 
condition of high disadvantage is obvious as to whether the authority’s actions are 
unfair or not. There is no doubt that people are confronted to unacceptable injustices 
that they cannot justify in any way.
Moreover, in line with the model in Study 3, one could argue that the condi-
tions of low and high disadvantage mostly differ on how they challenge individuals’ 
moral values. Low disadvantages are likely to be viewed as not violating impor-
tant moral stances. Therefore, individuals are less inclined to feel that they need 
to be redressed, especially when stemming from a legitimate authority. But when 
outcomes distribution is highly disadvantageous to the group, the legitimacy of 
the authority is overshadowed and loses its attenuating influence. In this condition, 
emotional and behavioural responses are shaped primarily by the moral values of 
individuals and not by the authority to which they no longer feel obliged to abide 
by the sole virtue of its legitimacy. In response to strong collective disadvantages, 
moral convictions take precedence over authority legitimacy in individuals’ moti-
vation to protest. Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Skitka, 2002; Skitka et al., 
2009), this tends to corroborate the notion that the deference to legitimate authori-
ties, as well as the restraint that they impose on the desire to revolt, is confined to 
situations where moral convictions do not come into play. From the perspective of 
social change, this indicates that the fight against injustices among those in subordi-
nate positions is possible, provided that their sense of morality may be on the alert 
and their moral values be infringed. Moral convictions serve as a guide for mak-
ing a decision as to whether participation in collective actions and disobedience to 
authority are acceptable or should be repressed. When disadvantages are high, the 
perceived damage to one’s moral values signals that protesting is required, leaving 
legitimization processes unable to operate. While legitimacy constrains the desire to 
protest, since obligating to compliance through fear of informal sanctions by peers 
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and formal sanctions by higher authorities, the violation of moral values frees indi-
viduals from such feelings of obligation and allows them to express their willingness 
to protest without restraint.
An alternative interpretation of our findings may be that the authority might no 
longer be perceived as legitimate in the condition of high disadvantage. Acting very 
unfairly would lead to a loss in legitimacy, thereby accounting for lower engagement 
in collective actions. To rule out this interpretation, we additionally tested whether 
the disadvantage manipulation might have an impact on perceived legitimacy. 
However, there was no statistical difference in legitimacy between the disadvan-
tage conditions (Study 2: F(1, 226) = 0.035, p = 0.852; Study 3: F(2, 299) = 0.278, 
p = 0.757). Furthermore, we found that the differences between the low and high 
legitimacy conditions were roughly equivalent, regardless of disadvantage levels 
(Study 2: mean difference in the low disadvantage condition = 4.24; p < 0.001; mean 
difference in the high disadvantage condition = 3. 37; p < 0.001; Study 3: mean dif-
ference in the no disadvantage condition = 3.58; p < 0.001; mean difference in the 
low disadvantage condition = 3.22; p < 0.001; and mean difference in the high disad-
vantage condition = 2.67; p < 0.001). Overall, these results indicate that participants 
were able to discriminate different levels of legitimacy even though disadvantages 
were strong. Therefore, we believe that the interpretation of our results in terms 
of an attenuating effect of legitimacy remains of relevance and best describes our 
findings. In the high disadvantage condition, the legitimacy of the authority did no 
longer serve as a buffer against engagement in protest although individuals kept on 
perceiving the authority figure as legitimate.
Moreover, our findings make an important contribution to social psychological 
research on collective actions. First, our research underscored the importance of 
authorities’ role in studying the psychological antecedents of collective actions. As 
daily news regularly makes the case (e.g. demonstrations against political leaders), 
authority figures do indeed have a large share of responsibility in their emergence 
and development. They can be trigger elements, as in the case of movements aimed 
at condemning the negligence or inefficiency of public authorities in managing a 
social issue, and also decisive sources of regulation, depending on whether proce-
dures for negotiation with third parties (e.g. trade unions) or, conversely, the use of 
public forces (e.g. police) have been implemented. Therefore, since protest actions 
can hardly be abstracted from a broader political context involving different catego-
ries of potentially antagonistic sources of power, it seems essential to further reflect 
on the role of political actors and especially of authority figures in our understand-
ing of individual tendencies to engage collectively (see, for example, Osborne et al., 
2019). This will undoubtedly pave the way for stimulating avenues of research that 
could complement or challenge the state of current knowledge. Second, our find-
ings add to the literature by reconsidering the well-documented relationship between 
perceived disadvantage and engagement in collective actions (Klandermans, 1997; 
Wright, 2001). Protest activities may not be necessarily at work as individuals expe-
rience group-based deprivations. Legitimacy of authority does matter a lot in this 
respect. As a result, perceived injustice should not be analysed separately from 
legitimacy as both predict collective actions in concert. Injustice and legitimacy 
always articulate one with the other and can simultaneously eliminate the effects 
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of the other as a function of their potential perceived strength. This way, our work 
goes way beyond the well-documented research showing that injustice is a key pre-
cursor to collective actions, and we argue that inclusion of legitimacy over injus-
tice perceptions can considerably augment our understanding of collective actions. 
Therefore, we strongly urge researchers to further explore this line of research and 
integrate authority legitimacy as a key construct into the predictions of collective 
action models.
Third, by illuminating the importance of moral concerns in collective actions, our 
research programme fits consistently with the findings of a growing body of previ-
ous research (e.g. Kutlaca et  al., 2019; Mazzoni et  al., 2015; Van Zomeren et  al., 
2011, 2012, 2018). Likewise, we found that moral value violation constitutes a key 
energizer of engagement in collective actions. However, we provided new pieces 
of evidence showing how moral violation is related to disadvantages and authority 
legitimacy. While previous research did not tell much on how morality and injustice 
are both associated on collective action tendencies, we have shown here that very 
acute disadvantages may strongly lead individuals to collective actions precisely 
because they break with individuals’ important moral stances. In this case, moral 
violation has such a potential that the legitimation processes are, to a certain extent, 
deactivated. In contrast, when moral values are not infringed by the collective disad-
vantages, engagement in collective actions crucially depends on whether the author-
ity figure benefits from high or low legitimacy.
Limitations
Despite these important theoretical implications, our research contains some limi-
tations. One pertains to the employment of vignettes. The main problem in using 
vignettes as a research methodology is that their ecological validity is relatively 
low and hardly allows to generalize the findings to real-life collective actions. The 
artificiality of such a research design may not reflect natural or genuine responses. 
Vignettes produce reactions that individuals imagine they would have experienced 
and not reactions that they would have really had in real-life situations, especially 
in the view of issues and constraints related to the workplace (e.g. fear of dismissal, 
labour market instability). Although Study 3 recruited only participants who were 
potentially familiar with the context described in the vignettes, it remains quite 
uncertain whether they correctly imagined themselves in the situation described, or 
whether they all imagined exactly the same situations based on their own experi-
ences. In future studies, our findings should be replicated in real-life protest settings 
in which participants are likely to be personally sensitive to the conditions of low 
and high disadvantage. For example, one might consider asking people about how 
they would support and be willing to participate in ongoing or forthcoming social 
movements (e.g. anti-austerity movements) and how this may be predicted by per-
ceptions of perceived disadvantage (e.g. perceptions of income inequality between 
the elite and the majority of the population) and legitimacy of authority (e.g. gov-
ernment or public authorities). Against this backdrop, another potential issue is that 
the vignettes described a workplace environment. Therefore, it is plausible that our 
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findings are strongly context dependent and cannot be easily transferable to political 
contexts. Future research should be conducted in various contexts to offer greater 
validity and generalization to the current findings. Furthermore, although intentions 
to protest have been shown to predict protest behaviours (de Weerd & Klandermans, 
1999), our studies did not include direct measures of behaviour and cannot conclude 
on how disadvantage and legitimacy interact on actual participation in collective 
actions. Once more, conducting field studies might be a way to address this pitfall.
Conclusion
Our studies have underscored the importance of the role of authorities in engaging 
individuals in collective actions. We have shown that an authority figure with strong 
legitimacy is likely to temper anger and desire to revolt in the face of disadvantage, 
to the extent it does not place individuals’ moral value system under threat. In this 
very case, the authority can no longer rely on legitimacy and will have to identify 
other means to contain possible uprisings and make people accommodate with an 
unfavourable situation. This reveals that group disadvantages, especially when they 
are not excessive and provoked by an authority who has gained strong legitimacy, 
may not necessarily lead to an intensive participation in protest actions. This may 
explain why, while socio-economic inequalities are still on the rise around the world 
(Piketty & Saez, 2014), the number of collective actions does not increase propor-
tionally and remains paradoxically low among those who are the first to suffer (Jost 
et al., 2017). Based on our results, we can conclude that the belief in the legitimacy 
of political institutions or governance structures, which contributes to the legitimiza-
tion of injustices, paralyses at the same time the possibility of attributing legitimacy 
to collective organizations and movements aimed at redressing social equity.
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